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The majority also alludes to the petitioner's affirmative responses to questions as
to whether he had been advised of his
rights, the nature of the charges against
'him, and the consequences of his plea. But
these responses beg the questions in issue:
only if petitioner in fact understood the
felony~murder doctrine, the nature of the
charges against him, the fact that his plea
made him eligible for capital punishment,
and the extent of his constitutional rights
could he have been competent to answer.
In my view the petitioner has sufficiently
alleged that his plea was involuntary and
that he did not knowingly waive his rights.
I believe he should be afforded a hearing

and could be maintained without meeting
statutory requisites of derivative suit and
without showing that injury was unique
to her; and that the complaint that the
majority shareholders fonned a new ,corporation whose major asset was to be the
control block of. association shares but from
which minority stockholders were excluded,
whereby the majority became holders of
stock more marketable than the association
shares, stated a cause of action.
Judgment reversed with directions to
overrule demurrer; cross appeal dismissed.
McComb, J., dissented.
Opinion, 76 CaJ.Rptr. 293, vacated.

to determine the truth of his allegations.

Rehearing denied; PETERS,

J., dissent

ing.
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81 Cal.Rptr. 592
June K. JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
H. F. AHMANSON & COMPANY et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

L. A. 29651.

Supreme Court ot California,
In Bank.,
Nov. 7, 1969.

As Modified on De-nial of Rehellrinji!;
Dec. 10, 1969.

Minority stockholder's class action
against holding company and present or
former holders of stock of savings and loan
association who had transferred a control
block of shares in the association to the
holding company, for breach of fiduciary
responsibility. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, Stevens Fargo, J.,. sustained demurrers without leave to amend,
and the minority stockholder appealed.
The Supreme Court, Traynor, C. J" held
that where the complaint did not seek recovery on behalf of the corporation for
injuries to the corporation or for injury
incidental to any injury to the corporation
but for injury to herself and other minority stockholders, her suit was not derivative

I. Building and Loan Associations P6(2)

Where complaint of minority stockholder of savings and loan association
against majority stockholders and holding
company did not seek recovery on behalf
of association for injuries to association or
for injury incidental to any jnjury to association but for injury to herself and other
minority stockholders, her suit was not
derivative and could be maintained without
meeting statutory requisites of derivative
suit and without showing that injury was
unique to her; disapproving in part Shaw
v. Empire Savings & Loan Assn., 186 Cal.
App.2d 401, 9 CaJ.Rptr. 204. West's Ann.
Financial Code, § 7616.
2. Corporations

~180

Any use to which majority shareholders put corporation or their power to control corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must not conflict with proper conduct of corporation's
business. West's Ann.F.inancial Code, §
7616.
3. Corporations

~180

Rule as to fiduciary duty of majority
stockholders is comprehensive rule of inherent fairness from viewpoint of corporation and those interested therein' and applies alike to officers, directors and controlling shareholders in exercise 'of powers
which are theirs by virtue of their position
and to transactions wherein controlling
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shareholders seek to gain advantage in
sale, transfer or use of their controlling
block of shares. West's Ann.Financial
Code, § 7616.
4. BuildIng and Loan AI.oclatlon.

~6(2)

Minority stockholder's complaint that
defendant majority shareholders of savings
and loan association formed new corporation whose major asset was to be control
block 6f association shares but from which
minority stockholders were excluded,
whereby majority became holders of stock
more marketable than association shares,
stated cause of action. West's Ann.Financial Cnde, §§ 5066-5069, 5500, 6400.
5. Building and Loan Associations ®:=I6(2)

Majority shareholders who for their
Own benefit -transferred their control block
in savings -and loan association to holding
company to create market for shares, excluding minority shareholders, breached
fiduciary duty to minority by pledging control over association's assets and earnings
to secure debt of holding company. West's
Ann.Financial Code, §§ 5066-5069, 5500,
6400.
6. Corporation's

~180

When no market exists for corporate
stockj con~ro11ing sharehold,ers may not use
their power to ,control corporation for pur-

pose of promoting marketing scheme which
benefits themselves alone to detriment of
minority. West's Ann.Financial Code. §
7616.
7. BuildIng and Loan As.oelatlons -(2)

Where majority shareholders of closely-held savings and loan association, to
create ready market for shares, transferred
control block to holding company, excluding minority shareholders, whereby control
of association became asset of public holding company, position of minority shareholder was changed and equities of situation required that she be allowed to elect
to receive fair market value of her association share on date of exchange or sum
equivalent to derived block of holding company stock with -share of capital returned
by holding company to its stockholders,
with interest but reduced by adjustment on
account of dividends. West's Ann.Corp.
460 P.2d-30

Code, §§ 4100-4124, 4300, 4304, 4306, 4308,
4310, 4311, 4600-4693; West's Ann.Financial Code, §§ 5066-5069, 5500,6400.
8. Monopolle. e:>28(6.2)

No cause of action for restraint of
trade under Cartwright Act or common-law
principles was stated without allegation of
purpose to restrain trade and of injury to
business of plaintiff traceable to actions in
furtherance of such purpose, or at least allegations from which purpose to eliminate
competition might be inferred. West's
Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 16720-16758,
16726, 16756; West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc.
§ 452.
9. Appeal and Error

~78(3)

Although judgment from which defendants appealed recited error in overruling demurter, order overruling demurrer
remained interlocutory and nonappealable.
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 904.1.
10. BuildIng and Loan Assoelatlons _(2)

Where majority shareholders' transfer
of control block of savings and loan association to holding company occurred on
May 14, 1959, first public offering of latter's stock and sale of debentures followed
about June 10, 1960 and offer to minority
stockholders was m,ade in September 1960.
and hearings on application for exchange
of holding _ company stock for minority
stock were held in fall of 1961, delay of
minority in initiating action in 1962 for
breach of fiduciary duty was not so long
as to be unreasonable, and where no prejudice 'was shown, action was not barred by
laches.
II. PartIe. ~80(5)
PleadIng ~65

In minority shareholder's action
against holding company and present or
former holders of savings and loan association stock who had transferred their
control block of association stock to holding company, minority shareholder's definition of class she purported "to represent as
"all of that portion of the other minority
stockholders who are similarly situated who
wish to rely thereon" and who agreed to
share in litigation expense showed requi-
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site community of interest and readily as·
certainable class, and demurrer based on
objection to class definition was properly
overruled. West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §
382.

•
Darling, Mack, Hall & Call and W. John
Kennedy, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and
respondent.
Edward M. Raskin,Gerald E. Lichtig,
Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp and Howard
S. Smith, Los Angeles, for defendants and
respondents.

eluded that the allegations of the complaint
and certain stipulated facts sufficiently
state a cause of action and that the judgment must therefore be reversed.
The following facts appear from :the allegations of the complaint and stipulation.
United Savings and Loan A~sociation of
California is a California .chartered savings and loan association that first issued
stock on April 5, 1956.1 Theretofore it had
been owned by its depositors, who, with
borrowing members, elected the board of
~ directors. No one depositor had sufficient
voting power to control the Association.

TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.
The Association issued 6,568 shares of
stock
on April 5, 1956. No additional stock
the capital stock of United Savings and
has been issued. Of these shares, 987
Loan Association of California brings this
action on behalf of herself individually· (14.8 percent) were purchased by deposiand of all similarly situated minority stock~ tors pursuant to warrants issued in proporholders of the Association. The defend- tion to the amount of their deposits. Plainants are United Financial Corporation of tiff was among these purchasers. The
shares allocated to unexercised warrants
California, fifteen individuals, and four
corporations, all of whom are present or were sold to the then chairman of the
board of directors who later resold them to
former stockholders or officers of the Asdefendants
and others. The stockholders
sociation. Plaintiff seeks damages and
have
the
right
to elect a majority of the
other relief for losses allegedly suffered by
directors
of
the
Association.
the minority stockholders of the Association because of claimed breaches of fiduThe Association has retained the major
ciary responsibility by defendants in the part of its earnings in tax-free reserves
creation anc;l operation of United Financial, with the result that the book value of the
a Delaware holding company that owns 87 'outstanding shares has increased substanpercent of the outstanding Association tially.· The shares were not actively·
stock.
traded. This inactivity is attributed to the
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment en- high book value, the ~losely held nature of
tered for defendants after an order sustain- the Association, 3 and the failure of the
ing defendants' general and special demur- management to provide investment inrers to her third amended complaint with- formation and assistance to shareholders,
out leave to amend. Defendants have filed brokers; or the public. Transactions in
a protective cross-appeal. We have con- the stock that did occur were primarily
June K. Jones. the owner of 2S shares of

1. A California savings and loan association
may be incorporated with shares, or stock,
or both. (Fin. Code. §§ 51500, 6400.)
Thus invf;stors in California a88OCiations
are identified as shareholders, f. e., holders of withdrawable shares of the association (Fin. Code, §§ 5066, 5067) or stockholders, i. e., holders of guarantee stock
of the association (Fin. Code, §§ 5068,
5(69).
The principal distinctions between stock and shares of a savings and
loan association are described in In re

Pacific Ooost Bldg.-Loan Assn. of Los
Angeles, 15 Cal.2d 134, 142, 99 P.2d 251.
2. Between 1959 and 1966 the book value
of each share increased from $1,131 to

$4,143.70.
3. H. F. Ahmanson & Co. acquired a majority of the shares in, May 1958. On
May 14, 1959, the company owned 4,171
of the outstanding shares.

JONES .... H. F. AHMANSON" OOI!llPANY
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-among existing stockholders. Fourteen
of the nineteen defendants comprised 95
percent of the market for Association"
shares prior to 1959.
In 1958 investor interest in shares of
savings and loan associations and holding
companies increased. Savings and loan
stocks that were publicly marketed enjoyed
a steady increase in' market price thereafter until June 1962, but the stock of
United Savings and Loan Association was
not among them. Defendants determined
to create a mechanism by which they could
participate in the profit taking by attract.ing investor interest in the Association.
They did not, however, undertake to render the Association shares more readily
marketable. Instead, the United Financial
. Corporation of California was incorporated
in Delaware by all of the other defendants
except defendant Thatcher on May 8,1959.
On May 14, 1959, pursuant to a prior
agreement, certain Association stockholders who among them owned a .majority
of the Association stock exchanged their
shares for those of United Financial, receiving a "derived block" of 250 United
Financial shares for each Association
share ..'
After the exchange, United Financial
heJd· 85 percent of the outstanding As4. The number of shares in these derived
blocks of United Financial stock was later modified by pro-rata surrenders and
stock dividends in a series of transactions
not pertinent here.
5. The balance reflected United Financial's

ownel'!'lhip of three insurance agencies and
stock in a fourth.
6. This distribution was equivalent to a
$927.50 return of capital on each derived block of shares.

7. Rule 480 then provided: "Debentures,
Notes and Evidences of Indebtedness, Unsecured. Ordinarily an application for
a permit to .sell and issue unsecured
notes, evidences of indebtedness or debentures by a n~w or comparatively inactive
company will be .considered with disfavor:

Cal.
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sodation stock. More than 85 percent of
United Financial's consolidated earnings G
and book value of its shares reflected its
ownership of this Association stock. The
former majority stockholders of the Assaciation had become the majority shareholders of United' Financial and continued to control the Association through the
holding company. They did not offer the
minority stockholders of the Association
an opportunity to exchange their shares.
The first public offering of United
Financial stock was made in June 1960.
To attract investor interest, 60,000 units
were offered, each of which comprised two
shares of United Financial stock and one
$100, 5 percent interest-bearing, subordinated, convertible debenture bond. The offering provided that of the $7,200,000 return from the sale of these units, $6,200,000
would be distributed immediately as a
return of capital to the original shareholders of United Financial, i. e.~ the
former majority stockholders of the Association.s To obtain a permit from the
California Corporations Commissioner for
the sale, United Financial represented that
the financial reserve requirement for
debentl1re repayment established· by Commissioner's Rules 480 subdivision (a) and
486" would be met by causing the Associ(8) If the issue creates indebtedness in
excess of two times the tangible net worth
of the issuer;
.(b) Unless the issue provides for continued participation in the issuer on an
equitable basis upon the redemption or
retirement of the notes, evidences of indebtedness or debentures;
(c) Unless estimated annual net earn~
hlgs are at least two times annual interest and sinking fund or serial redemption requirements;
(d) Unless the sinking fund or serial
redemption requirements contemplate the
retirement of the entire issue by date of
maturity."
'Rule 486 tllen provided: "Required
Earnings and Sinking Fund. Ordinary
average annual earnings, before taxes.
for the five-year period preceding the
issue, and for the year immediately preceding tile issue, or estimated earnings,
should be .at least two times annual .in-
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atian to liquidate or encumber its
producing assets for cash that the
ation would then distribute to
Financial to service and retire the

income
AssociUnited
bonds.s

In the Securities and Exchange Com'mission prospectus accompanying this first
public offering, United Financial acknowl~dged that its prior earnings were not
sufficient to service the debentures and
noted that United Financial's direct earnings would have to be augmented by dividends from the Association.
A public offering of 50,000 additional
shares by United Financial with a secondary offering of 600,000 shares of the
derived stock by the original investors
was made in February 1961 for a total
price of $15,275,000. The defendants sold
568,190 shares of derived stock in this
secondary offering,
An underwriting
syndicate of 70 brokerage finns participated. The reSUlting nationwide publicity
stimulated trading in the stock until, in
mid-I96I, an average of 708.5 derived
blocks were traded each month. Sales of
Association shares decreased during this
period from a rate of 170 shares per year
before the fonnation of United Financial
to half that number. United Financial
acquired 90 percent of the Association
shares that were sold.
tercst requirements. Ordinarily average
annual earnings. after taxes, and after
giving effect to interest requirements on
the proposed new security, for such five~
year period and for such year, or e8ti~
mnted earnings, should be at lenst two
times sinking fund or serial redemption
requirements. The sinking fund' or serinl
redemption
requirements
. ordinarily
should be 'based au n contemplated retirement of substantially the entire issue
by maturity.n
The Commissioner has since adopted
new rules. (Rules 260.140.4-0.)

8. Plaintiff alleges at Paragraph V (C) (3)
of 'her complaint that United Financial
represented to the Corporations Commissioner that: uThe financial reserves for
debenture repayment required by the
Commissioner's Rules 48O(a) and 486
would be satisfied by having United
Financial exercise its control to cause

Shortly after the first public offering
of United Financial shares, defendants
caused United Financial to offer to pur~
chase up to 350 shares of Association stock
for $1,100 per share. The book value of
each of these shares was $1,411.57, and
earnings were $301.15 per share. The
derived blocks of United Financial shares
then commanded an aggregate price of
$3,700 per. block exclusive of the $927.50
return of capital. United Financial ac·
quired an additional 130 shares of Association stock as a result of this offer.
In 1959 and 1960 extra dividends of
$75. and $57 per share had been paid by
the Association, but in December 1960,
after the foregoing offer had been made,
defendants caused the Association's president to noti fy each minority stockholder
by letter that no dividends other than the
regular $4.00 per share annual dividend
would be paid in the near future. The
Association president, defendant M. D.
Jameson, was then a director of both the
Association and United Financial.
Defendants then proposed an exchange
of United Financial shares for Association
stock. Under this proposal each minority
stockholder would have received approximately 51 United Financial shares of a
total value of $2,400 for each Association
share. When the application for a permit
the ASSOCIATION to liquidate or encumber its income -producing assets for
cash and then CRuse the ASSOCIATION
to distribute the cash to United Financial
in order to service and retire the debentures."
Defendants dispute plaintiff's
interpretation of United Financial's representations. They claim that United
Financial tlid no more than promise to
liquidate its own assets, i. e., the Association stock that it owned, and distribute
those assets to service the debt. On appeal from a judgment entered after a
demurrer bas been sustained, a reviewing
court must Rccept all properly pleaded
allegations not iI\consisteilt with other
nl1egations as true. (Stigall v. City of
Taft, 58 Cn1.2d 565, 567, 25 Cnl.Rptr.
441, 375 P.2<1 289; Katenkamp v. Union
Realty Co., 6 Cnl.2d 765, 769, 59 P.2d
473.) No dispute can exist as to the
interpretation of the nlJegntion of the
complaint here in question.

•
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was filed with the Cali fomia 'Corporations
Commissioner on August 28, 1961, the value
of the derived bloCks of United Financial
shares received by defendants in the initial
exchange had risen to approximately $8,.
BOO." The book value of the Association
stock was in excess of $1,700 per share,
and the shares wefe earning at an annual
rate of $615 per share. Each block of 51
United Financial shares had a book value
of only $210 and earnings of $134 per year,
85 percent of which' reflected Association
earnings. At the hearings held on the application by the Commissioner, representatives of United Financial justified the high.
er valuation of United Financial shares
on the ground thal,they were highly mar·
ketable, whereas Association stock was un~
marketable and poor collateral for loans.
Plaintiff and other minority stockholders
objected to the proposed exchange, contend·
ing that the plan was not fair, just, and
equitable. Defendants then asked the Com·
missioner to abandon the application with·
out ruling 'on it.

vantage to the detriment of the minority
when they -created United Financial, made
a public market for its shares that rendered
Association stock 'unmarketable except to
United Financial, and' then refused either
to purchase plaintiff's Association' stock at
a fair price or exchange the stock
the
same basis afforded to the majority. She
further alleges that they also created a con·
fliet of interest that might have been avoided had they <lffered all Association stock·
holders - the opportunity to participate in
the initial exchange of shares.. Finally,
plaintiff contends'that the defendants' acts
constituted a' restraint of trade in violation
of Common law and statutory antitrust laws.

on

I

Plaintiff'S Capacity 10 Sue

[1] . We are' faced at the outset with
defendants' contention that iJ a cause of
action is stated, it is derivative in' 'nature
since any injury suffered is common to all
minority stockholders of the Association.
Therefore, defendants urge, plaintiff may
Plainti ff contends that in following this not sue in an individtlal capacity or on becourse of conduct defendants breached the half of a class made up of stockholders
fiduciary duty owed by majority or con~ . excluded 'from the United Financial ex-'
trolling shareholders to' minority share~ change, and in any case may not maintain a
holders. She alleges that they used their derivative action without complying with
control of the Association for their own ad~ Financial Code, secHo,n 7616.1.0 ··Defendan~s
9. The derived block sold for as much as
$13.127.41 during 1960-1961. On Jan·
uary 30, 1962, the (lnte upon which plaintiff eommeneell this nction, the menn
value was $9.116.o..~.'
'
10. Section 7616 provides: "Xo action may
be instituted Or mnintninell in the ri$ht

of any association by any sbareholder' or
certificate holder, as such. Such action
may not be instituted or maintained by
a stockholder of any association, unless
all of the fonowing conditions exist:
"(1) The plaintiff allegeM in the complaint thnt h~ was a registered stockholder at the ·time of the transaction or
any -part thereof of -which he complains
or thnt his stock thereafter devolved upon
him by operation of law from a holder
who was a holder at the time of the
transaction or any part thereof complained of.
"(2) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint with particularity' his efforts to

secure 'from the board of directors such
action as he ,desires and alleges further
thot he has either informed the association or such boord of directors in writing
of the ultimate filets of each cause of
action against each defendant director or
delivered to the association or such board
of directors a true copy of the complaint
which he 'proposes to file, nnd the reaSOns
for his failure to obtain such action or
the reason for not making such effort.
"(3) The commissioner shall have determine(l. 'after a hearing upOn at least· ..
20 dayk' written notice to sueh assoclation anll eoeb of its directors, that such
nction (0) is proposed in good faith and
(b) there is rensonable possibility that
the prosecution of such action will benefit
the association and. its stockholders.

"Subdivisions (b) and' (c) of Section
834 of the Corporations Code shall be
applicable in the case of any such action."
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invoke Shaw v. Empire Savings & Loan third parties. The, management owes to the
Assn., 186 Cal.App.2d 401, 9 CaI.Rptr. 204. stockholders a duty to take proper steps
There the defendant majority stockholder, to enforce all claims which the corporation
who controlled the board bf directors, had may have. When it fails to perform this
the bylaws amended to delete a provision duty, the stockholders have a right to do
granting preemptive rights and thereafter so, Thus, although the corporation is made
caused the Association to issue shares to a defendant in a derivative suit, the corhimsel f at less than market or book value, poration nevertheless is the real plaintiff
thus diluting plaintiff minority stockhold- 'and it alone benefits from the decree;
er's interest. Plaintiff sought a dec1ara~ the stockholders derive -no benefit theretion that he was entitled to maintain his from except the indirect benefit resulting
proportionate interest in the Association from a realization upon the corporation's
either through purchase of a proportionate assets. The stockholder's individual suit,
number of shares from the buyer or issu- on the other hand, is a suit to enforce a
ance of a proportionate number of addi- right against the corporation which the
tional shares to him by the Association on stockholder possesses as an individual."
the same tenns. The Court of Appeal (Rules of Civ.Proc. for U. S. District
concluded that inasmuch as the injury to Courts, Advisory Committee Notes (1966)
the plaintiff was no different from that H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
caused other minority stockholders, relief 40.)
was available only in a derivative action.
It is clear from the stipulated facts and
plaintiff's
allegations that she does not seek
Analysis of the nature and purpose of a
to
recover
on behalf of the corporation
shareholders' derivative suit will demonstrate that the test adopted in the Shaw for injury done to the corporation by decase does not properly distinguish the cases fendants. Although she does allege that the
in which an individual cause of action lies. value of her stock has been diminished by
A shareholder's derivative suit seeks to defendants' actions, she does not contend
recover for the benefit of the corporation that the_ diminished value reflects an in jury
and its whole body of shareholders when to the corporation and resultant depreciainjury is caused to the corporation that may tion in the value of the stock Thus the
not otherwise be redressed because of gravamen of her cause of action is injury
failure of the corporation to act. Thus, to herself and the other minority stock"the action is derivative, i. e., in the cor- holders.
porate right, if the gravamen -of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the
whole body of its stock or property without
any severance or distribution among individual holders, or if it seeks to recover assets for the corporation or to prevent the
dissipation of its assets." (Gagnon Co.,
Inc. v. Nevada Desert Inn, 45 C.1.2d 448,
453, 289 P.2d 466, 471; Sutter v. General
Petroleum Corp" 28 CaI.2d 525, 530, 170
P.2d 898, 167 A.L.R. 271; see Ballantine &
Sterling, California Corporation Laws (4th
ed. 1968) 168B.) "A stockholder's derivative suit is brought to enforce a cause of
action which the corporation itself possesses against some third party. a suit to recompense the corporation for injuries which
it has suffered as a result of the acts of

In Shaw v. Empire Savings & Loan
Assn., supra, 186 Cal.App.2d 401, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 204, the court noted the "well established general rule that a stockholder of
a corporation has no personal or individual
right of action against third persons, including the corporation's officers and directors, for a wrong or injury to the corporation which results in the destruction
or depreciation of the value of his stock,
since the wrong thus suffered by the stockholder is merely incidental to the wrong
suffered by the corporation and affects all
stockholders alike." (186 CaI.App.2d 401,
407, 9 Cal.Rptr. 204, 208.) From this the
court r'easoned that a minority shareholder
could not maintain an individual action
unless he could demonstrate the injury to
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him was somehow different from that suffered by other minority shareholders. (186
Ca1.App.2d 401, 408, 9 Ca1.Rptr. 204.) In
so concluding the court erred.. The individual wrong necessary to support a suit by
a shareholder need not be unique to that
plaintiff.l l The same injury may affect
a substantial number of shareholders., If
the injury is not incidental to an injury
to the corporation, -an individual cause of
action exists. To the extent that Shaw
v. Empire Savings & Loan Assn. is inconsistent with the opinion expressed herein,
it is disapproved.

The extensive reach of the duty of controlling shareholders and directors to the
corporation. and its other shareholders was
described by the Court of Appeal in Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini, supra,
109 Ca1.App.2d 405, 241 P 2d 66, where,
quoting from the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281, the
court held,: "'A director is a fiduciary.
*, • • So is a dominant or controlling
stockholder or group of stockholders. * *
Their powers are powers in trust. • • •
Their dealings with the _corporation are
subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where
any of their contracts or engagements with
II
the corporation is challenged the burden is
on the director or stockholder not only
Majority Shareholders' Fiduciary
to prove the good faith of the transaction
Responsibility
[2] Defendants take the position that as but also to show its inherent fairness from
shareholders they owe no fiduciary obliga- the viewpoint of the corporation and those
tion to other shareholders, absent reliance interested therein. * * * The essence
on inside information, use of corporate as- of the test is whether or not under all the
sets, or fraud. This view has long been circumstances the transaction carries the
repudiated in California. The Courts of. earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If
of Appeal. have often recognized that ma-· it does not, equity will set it aside.' Rejority shareholders, either singly or acting ferring directly to the duties, of a director
in concert to accomplish a joint, purpose, the court stated * '* *: 'He who is in
have a fiduciary responsibility tp the mi- such a fiduciary position cannot serve
nority and to" the corporation to use their himself first and his cestuis second. He
ability to control the, corporation in a fair, cannot manipulate the affairs of his corMajority poration to their detriment and in disregard
just, and equitable maimer.
shareholders may not use their power to of the standards of common decency and
control ~orporate activities to benefit them- honesty. He cannot by the intervention of
selves alone or in a manner detrimental a corpora~e entity violate the ancient preto "the minority. "Any use to which they cept against serving two masters. He canput the corporation or their power to con- not by the use of the corporate device
trol the corporation ,must benefit all share- avail himself of privileges nonnally perholders proportionately and must not con- mitted butsiders in a race of creditors.
cannot utilize his inside infonnation
flict with ,the proper conduct Qf the corand
his strategic position for his own
poration's business. (Brown v. ;Halbert,
pteferm~nt:
He cannot violate rules of
271 A.C.A. 307, 316, 76 Ca1.Rptr. r~i;
fair
play
by
doing
indirectly through the
Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Ca1.App.2d 828, 47
c~rporaiion
what
he
could n~t do directly.
Ca1.Rptr. 392; Efron. v. Kalmanovitz, ~
cannot
use
his
power
for his personal
Ca1.App2d 546, 38 Ca1.Rptr. 148; Remil,
lard 'Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini" 109 advantage and to the detriment of the
Ca1.App.2d 405, 241 P.2d 66.)
stockholders and creditors no matter how

Jfe

lie

II. See Note. 49 Cal.L.Rev. Ml, criticizing
the result in Shaw and pointing out that
the rule" espoused by the Court of Appeal would leave the shareholder whose

injury was not unique without a remedy
if the corporation was not also injured
by the same wrongful conduct.
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absolute in terms that power may be and sires or knowledge of the minority stockno matter how meticulous he is to satisfy holders; • • ." (I'. 806, 158 P. p. 759)
technical requirements. For that power and held that such fiduciary duty as did
is at all times subject to the equitable exist in officers and directors was to the
limitation that it may not be exercised for corporation only. The duty of shareholders
the aggrandizement, preference, or ad· as such was not recognized unless they, like
vantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion officers and directors, by virtue of their
or detriment of the cestuis. Where there position were possessed of information relis a violation of these principles, equity ative to the value of the corporation's
will undo the wrong or intervene to pre- shares that was not available to outside
vent its consummation.' This is the law of shareholders. In such case' the existence
California." (109 Ca1.App.2d 405, 420--421, 'of special facts permitted a finding that a
241 P.2d 66, 75.) In RemiUard the Court fiduciary relationship to the corporation
of Appeal clearly indicated that the fiduci- and other shareholdtrs existed. (Hobart
ary obligations of directors and share- v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 159
holders are neither limited to specific P.2d 958.)
statutory duties and avoidance of fraudu[3] We had occasion to review these
lent practices nor aTe they owed solely to theories as well as the "minority rule" that
the -corporation to the exclusion of other
directors and officers have an obligation
shareholders.
to shareholders individually not to profit
Defendants assert, however, that in the from their official position at the shareuse of their own shares they owed no fi- holders' expense in American Trust Co. v.
duciary duty to the minority stockholders California etc. Ins. Co., 15 Cal.2d 42, 98
of the Association. They maintain that P.2d 497. Each of the traditional rules has
they made full disclosure of the circum- been applied under proper circumstances
stances surrounding the -formation of Un,it- to enforce the fiduciary obligations of cored Financial, that the creation of United porate officers and directors to their cestuis.
Financial and its share offers in no way (Lawrence v. 1. N. Parlier Estate Co., 15
affected the control of the Association, that Cal.2d 220, 100 P.2d 765 [directors may not
plaintiff's proportionate interest in the As~ engage in any transaction that will consociation was not affected, that the Asso~ flict with their duty to the shareholders
ciation was not harmed, and that the mark~ or make use of their power or of the coret for Association stock was not affect- porate property for their own advantage] ;
ed. Therefore, they conclude, they have Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26
breached no fiduciary duty to plainti ff and Cal.2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 [officer must disthe other minority stockholders.
close knowledge of corporate business to
Defendants would have us retreat from a shareholder in transaction involving trans- .
position demanding equitable treatment of fer of stock]; In re Security Finance Co.,
all shareholders by those exercising control 49 Cal.2d 370, 317 P.2d. 1 [majority shareover a corporation to a philosophy much holders' statutory powers subject to equitacriticized by commentators and modified ble limitation of good _faith and inherent
by courts in other jurisdictions as well as fairness to minority].) The rule that has
our own. In essence defendants suggest developed in California is a comprehensive
that we reaffirm the so:..called "majority" ruie of "inherent fairness from the viewrule reflected in our early decisions. This point of the corporation and those interestrule, exemplified by the decision in Ryder ed therein." (Remillard Brick Co. v. Rev. Bamberger, 172 Cal. 791, 158 P. 753 but millard-Dandini, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d 405,
since severely limited, recognized the 420, 241 P.2d 66, 75. See also, In re Se"perfect right [of majority shareholders] curity Finance Co., supra, 49 Cal.2d 370,
to dispose of their stock * * * without 317 P.2d 1; Brown v. Halbert, supra, 271
the slightest regard to the wishes and de- A.CA. 307, 76 Cal.Rptr. 781; Burt v.
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Irvine Co., supra, 237 CaI.App.2d 828,
47 Cal.Rptr. 392; Efron v. Kalrnanov~tzJ
supra, 226 Cal.App.2d 546, 38 CaI.Rptr.
148.) The rule applies alike to officers,
directors, ,and controlling shareholders in
the exercise of powers that afe theirs by
virtue of their position and to transactions
wherein controlling shareholders seek to
gain an advantage in the sale or transfer
or use of their controlling block of shares.
Thus we held i.J;t -In re Security Finance,
supra, 49 CaL2d370, 317 P.2d I, that majority shareholders do not have a1) absolute
right to dissolve a corporation, although ,.
ostensibly permitted to do so by Corporations Code, section 4600, because their statutory power is subject to equitable limi- .
tations in favor of the minority. We recognized that the majority had the right to
dissolve the corporation to protect their
investment if no alternative means were
available, and no advantage was secured
over other shareholders, and noted that
uthere is -nothing sacred in the life of a
corporation that transcends the interests of
its shareholders, but because dissolution
falls with such finality on those interests,
above all corporate powers it is s,ubject to
equitable limitations." (49 Cal.2d 370, 377,
317 P.2d I, 5.)
The extension of fiduciary obligations to
controlling shareholders in their exercise
of corporate powers and dealings with their
shares is J;lot a recent development. The
-Circuit Court for the Southern District of
New York said in 1886 that "when a number of stockholders combine to constitute
. themselves a majority in order to control
the corporation, as they see fit, they become
for all practical purposes the corporation
itself, and assume the trust relation occupied _,by the corporation towards its stockholders." (Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & ·Nav.
Co. (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 625, 631.)
Professor Lattin has suggested that "the
power'to controi, or rather its use, should
be considered in no lesser light than that
of a trustee to deal with the trust estate
and with the beneficiary. Self-dealing in
whatever form it occurs should be handIed with rough hands for what it is--<1is460 P.2d-301fa

honest dealing. And while it is often difficult to discover self-dealing in mergers,
consolidations, sale of aU the assets or dissolution and liquidation, the difficulty
makes it eveD more imperative that the
search be thorough and relentless." Lattin, Corporations (1959) 565.)

The increasingly complex transactions
of the business and financial communities
demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional theories of fiduciary obligation as
tests of majority shareholder responsibility
to the minority. These theories have failed
to afford adequate protection to minority
shareholders and particularly to those in
closely held corporations whose disadvantageous and often precarious position renders them particularly vulnerable to the
vagaries of the majority. Although courts
have recognized the potential for, abuse or
unfair advantage when a controlling shareholder sells his shares at a premium over
investment value (Perlman v. Feldmann,
219 F.2d 173, 50 A.L.R.2d 1134 [premium
paid for con,trol over allocation of production in time of shortage]; Gerdes v. Reynolds, Sup., 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 [sale of control to looters or incompetents] j Porter v.
Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428; Brown v.
Halbert, supra, 271 A.c.A. 307, 76 Ca1.Rptr.
781 [sale of only controlling shareholder's
f shares to purchaser offering to buy as. sets of corporation or all shares]) or in a
controlling shareholder's use of control to
avoid equitable distribution of corporate assets (Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation
(3rd Cir. 1946) 162 F.2d 36, 172 A.L.R.
495 [use of control to cause subsidiary to
redeem stock prior to liquidation and distribution of assets]), no comprehensive rule
has emerged in other jurisdictions. Nor
have most commentators approached the
problem from a perspective other, than
that of the advantage gained in the sale of
control. Some have suggested that the
price paid for control shares over their
investment value be treated as an asset
belonging to the corporation itself (Berle
and Means, The Modem Corporation and
Private Property (1932) p. 243), or as an
asset that should be shared proportionately
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with all shateholders through a general
offer (Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control (1956) 44 Ca1.L.Rev. 1,39), and another contends that the sale of control at a pre-

mium is always evil (Bayne, The Sale-ofControl Premium: the Intrinsic Illegitimacy (1969) 47 Tex.L.Rev. 215).
The additional potential for injury to
minority shareholders from majority deal-

ings in its control power apart from sale
has not gone unrecognized, however. The
ramifications of defendants' actions here
are not unlike those described by Professo,r
. Gower as occurring when control of one
corporation is acquired by another through

purchase of less than all of the shares of
the latter: "The [acquired] company's ex-

istence is- not affected, nor need its constitution be altered; all that occurs is that
its shareholders change. From the legal
viewpoint this methodological distinction is

formidable, but commercially the two things
may be almost identical. If • • • a
controlling interest' is acquired, the [acquired] company

* * *

will become a

subsidiary of the acquiring company * *
and cease, in fact though not in law, to be
an independent entity.
"This may produce the situation in which
a small number of dissentient members are
left as a minority in a company intended
to be operated as a member of a group.
As such, their position is likely to be unhappy, for the parent company will wish to
operate the subsidiary for the benefit of
the group as a whole and not necessarily
for the benefit of that particular subsidiary."
(Gower, The Principles of
Modern Company l.aw (2d ed. 1957 p.
561).) Professor Eisenberg notes that as
the purchasing corporation's proportionate
interest in the acquired corporation approaches 100 percent, the market for the
latter's stock disappears, a problem that is
12. Contrary to defendants' Suggestion that
Christophides v. Porco, (S.D.N.Y.) 289
F. SupP. 403 provides suppert for their
argument that they owe no fiduciary duty
to the minority and may - act with impunity to cause a dimunition in the value
of minority shares, the district court
noted that although such conduct did not

aggravated if the acquiring corporation for
its own business purposes reduces or eliminates dividends. (Eisenberg, The Legal
Role of Shareholders and Management in
Modern Corporate Decision-II1i'king (1969)
57 Cal.L.Rev. I, 132. See also, O'Neal and
Derwin, ExpUlsion or Oppression of Business Associates (1961) passim; Leech,
Transactions in Corporate Control (1956)
104 U.Pa.L.Rev. n5, 728; Comment, The
Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Shareholder to the Minority Shareholders (1958)
9 Hastitlgs'L]:' 306, 314.) The case before
us, in which no 'sale or transfer of actual
control is directly involved, demonstrates
that the injury anticipated by these authors
can be inflicted with impunity under the
traditional rules and supports our conclusion that the comprehensive rule of good
faith and inherent fairness to the minority
in any transaction where control ,of the
corporation is material properly governs
controlling shareholders in this state. 12
We tum now to defendants' conduct to
ascertain whether this test is met.
III

Formation of United Financial and
Marketing its Shares
[4) Defendants created United Financial during a period of .unusual investor
interest in the stock 'of savings and loan
associations. They then owned a majority
of the outstanding stock of the Association.
This stock was not readily marketable
owing to a high book value, lack of investor
information and facilities, and the closely
held nature of the Association. The
.management of the Association had made
no effort to create a market for the stock
or to split the shares and reduce their
market price to a more attractive level.
Two courses were available to -defendants
in their effort to exploit the bull market
violate the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, § 10(b). 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) ,

the charge might have significance "in
respect of some sort of state-created claim
for fiduciary breach" over which that
court lacked jurisdiction. (289 F.Supp.
ot 407.)
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in savitigs and loan stock. Both were
made possible by defendants' status as
controlling stockholders. The first was
either to cause the Association to effect a
stock split (Corp.Code, § 1507) and create
a market for the Association stock or to
create a holding company for Association
'shares and permit all stockholders to exchange their shares before offering holding company shares to the public. All
stockholders would have benefited alike
had this been dorie, but in realizing their
gain on the sale of their.stock.t~JIlajority.
stockholders would of necessity have haa
to relinquish some of their control shares.
Because a public market would have ,been
created, however, the minority stockholders
would have been able to extricat~ themselves without sacrificing their investment
had they elected not to remain with the
Dew management.
13. The situation of minority stockholders
and the difficulties they faced in attempting to market their 'savings and loan stock
were described in The Savings and Loan
Industry in California, a report pre~
pared by the Stanford Research Institute
for the California Savings and Loan
Commissioner, and published by the Commissioner in 1960. The attractiveness of
the holding company as ,8 device to enhance liquidity was recognized: "The
majority and minority' stockholders in
the original associations often found that
they had difficulties in seIJing their
shares at a price approximating their
book value. Their main difficulties arose
from the fact that book values and
prices of shares often ran into many thousands of dollars, a price not generally
suitable for wide public sale. These
shares were usually owned by a relatively
small number of stockholders. When one
of them, or his heirs, wished to sell his
shares, he had to negotiate with a buyer
in this small group or attempt to find
an outside purchaser. Minority stock~
holders had a special problem, because
they could not sell control, with their
stock.
''The holding company was regarded by
many stockholders' a'l!J an attractive device
to solve the problem of the marketability
of their shares. Through this method,
the control 'of one, two, or several associations could be consolidated and of'fered to the investing public in a single
large stock issue ,at relatively low prices,

The second course was that taken by defendants. A new corporation -was formed
whose major asset was to be the control
block of Association stock owned by defendants', but from which minority shareholders were to be excluded. The unmarketable Association stock held by the majority was transferred to the newly formed corporation at an exchange rate equivalent to a 250 for 1 stock split. Thenew
corporation thereupon set out to create a
market for its own shares. Association
stock constituted 85 percent of the holding
company's assets and produced an equivalent proportion of its income. The same individuals controlled both corporations. It
appears therefrom that the market created
by defendants for United Financial shares
was a market that would have been available for Association stock had defendants
taken the first course of action.13
either over the counter or through a
stock exchange. The wide public ownership of holding company shares would
thus provide a more active market and
more protection against large capital
losses in the event the original owners
or their heirs wished to sell their holding company stock.

"

...

"Large capital gains on the sale of holding companY stock to the public have
been ,an important ineentive and consequence of this form Qf organization. The
issuance of holding company stock to the
general public usually found an enthusiastic demand which made it- possible
to sell the stock for as much as two to
three times book value. In many but
not all cases, the majority stockholders
in the original associations have offered
less than 50 percent of the holding company's stock to the public, thus retaining
control of 'the association and the holding
companies." (The Savings and Loan Industry in California (1960) pp. VI-6VI-7.) Although defendants suggest that
their transfer of the insurance businesses
, and the later acquisition of another savings and loan association by United Financial were necessary to the creation
of a market for United Financial shares
and that no market could be created for
the shares of a single savings nnd loan
association, the study does not support
their claim. 'Vhether defendants could
have created a market for a holding company that controlled a fringle association
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After United Financial shares became
available to the public it became a virtual
certainty that no equivalent market could
or would be created for Association stock.
United Financial had become the control~
ling stockholder and neither it nor the other defendants would benefit from public
trading in Association stock in competition
with United Financial shares. Investors afforded an opportunity to acquire United
Financial shares would not be likely to
choose the less marketable and expensive
-Association stock in preference. Thus de- .
fendants chose a course of action in which
they used their control of the Association
to. obtain an advantage not made available
to all stockholders.. They <lid so without
regard to the resulting detriment to the
minority stockholders and in the absence
of any compelling business purpose. Such
conduct is not consistent with thei r duty of
good faith and inherent fairness to the minority stockholders. Had defendants afforded the minority an opportunity to exchange their stock on the same basis or
offered to purchase them at a price arrived
at by independent appraisal, their burden of
establishing good faith and inherent fairness would have been much less. At the
trial they may present evidence tending to
show such good faith or compelling business purpose that would render their action
fair under the circumstances. On appeal
from the judgment of dismissal a fter the
defendants' demurrer was sustained we decide only that the complaint states a cause
of action ,entitling plaintiff to ~e1ief.
[5] Defendants gained an additional
advantage for themselves through their use
of control of the Association when they
pledged that control over the Association's
assets and earnings to secure the holding
or reasonably' believed ,that they could
not, goes to their good faith and to the
existence of a proper business purpose
for electing the course that they chose to
follow. At the trial of the cause defend·
ants cnn introduce evidence relevant to
the necessity for inclusion of other busi·
nesses.
14. Should it become necessary to encumber
or liquidate Association assets to servi('e
this debt or to depart from a dividend

company's debt, a debt that had been incurred for their own benefit." In so doing the
defendants breached their fiduciary obligation to the minority once again and
caused United Financial and its controlling
shareholders to become inextricably wedded
to a conflict of interest between the minority stockholders of each corporation. Alternatives were available to them that
would have benefited all stockholders proportionately. The course they chose affected the minority stockholders with no less
finality than does dissolution (In re Security Finance, supra, 49 Ca1.Zd 370, 317 P 2d
1) and demands no less concern for minority interests.
[6] In so holding we do not suggest
that the dudes of corporate fiduciaries include in all cases an obligation to make a
market for and to facilitate public trading
in the stock of the corporation. But when,
as here, no market exists, the controlling
sharehoiders may not use their power to
control the corporation for the purpose of
promoting a marketing scheme that benefits themselves alone to the detriment of the
minority. Nor do we suggest that a control
block of shares may not be sold or transferred to a holding company. We decide only
that the circumstances of any transfer of
controlling shares will be subject to judicial
scrutiny when it appears that the controlling shareholders may have breached their
fiduciary obligation to the corporation or
the remaining shareholders.

IV
Damages

[7] Plaintiff contends that she should
have been afforded the opportunity to expolicy consistent with the business needs
of the Association, damage to the As·
sociation itself may occur. We need not
resolve here, but note with some concern,
the problem facing United Financial,
which owes the same fiduciary duty to its
own sl18reholders as to those of the Association. Any decision regarding use of
Association RSsets and earnings to sen'·
ice the holding company debt must be
made in the context of these potentially
conflicting interests.
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change her stock for United Financial
shares at the time of a'rid on the same basis
as the niajority exchange. She therefore
proposes that upon tender of her Association stock to the defendants she be- awarded
the fair' market value of a derived block
of United Financial shares during 1%01962 plus interest -from the date of her action as well as a return of capital of $927.50 plus interest ftom the date the same was
made to the former "~ajority shareholders.
In addition she seeks ,exe~plary ~amages
and other relief. " r
Defendants, on the other hand, claim that
plaintiff seeks a IIfree ride" after they have
taken ,all of the risks in creating United
Financial and marketing its stock. They
maintain that plaintiff has not been damaged by their conduct and that they have
breached no duty owed to plaintiff and the
other minority stockholders. We are thus
without guidance from defendants as to the
remedy that a court of, equity might appropriately fashion-in these tireumstances.From the perspective of the minority
stockholders o-f the Association, the transfer
of contr~l under these circJlmst~nces to
another corporation and the resulting impact on their positi~n as minority stockholders accomplished a fundamental corporate change as to them. ,Control of a
closely held savings and loan association,
the major portion of whose earnings had
~en retained over a l~ng period while its
stockholders remained stable, became an a~
set of a publicly held holding company.
The._positic;m of th~ minority shareholder
was drastically' changed thereby:! His
pract,ical ability to influence c(>rpora~e decisionmaking was diminished, ~~bs~antil~p~ ,
when control was transferred to -a publicly'
he1d.corporation that was in 'turn controlled
by the owners of more than 750,000
shares.11f The· future business goals of the
Association could reasonably be' expetted to
reflect the needs and interest';{ the hold~
iog company rather than the aims of the
15. - Although the B. F. AhmaD80D &; '00.
owned 0. majority of the Association
&t()('k prior, to the exchange, it appears

Association stockholders thereafter. In
short, the enterprise into which the minority
stockholders were now locked was not that
in which they had invested.
The more familiar fundamental corporate changes, merger, consolidation" and
dissolution, are accompanied by statutory
and judicial safeguards established to protect minority shareholders. (Corp.Code, §§
4100-4124, 4600-4693.) Shareholders dis;
senting from a merger of their corporation'
into another may demand that the corporation purchase their shares at the fair
market value. (Corp.Code, § 4300.) If
the .shareholders and the corporation fail to
agree on that value, 'the shareholders may
call upon the court, which may in turn appoint" independent appraisers to - assist in
evaluating the shares. (Corp.Code, §§ 4306,
4308, 4310.) This procedure makes possible determination of value unaffected 'by
any market distortion caused by the merger
(Gallois v. West End Chemical Co., 185 Cal.
App.2d 765; 8 Cal.Rptr. 596) and enables
stockholders iIi a closely held corporation
whose shares are not publicly marketed to
obtain an- independent judgment as to the
value of their shares. Protection- of shareholder interests is achieved in voluntary
corporate dissolution by judicial supervision
to assure equitable settlement of the corporation's -affairs. (Corp.Code, § 4607; In
re Security Finance Co., supra, ~9 Ca1.2d
370, 317 P.2d I.)
JudiCial protection has also been afforded th~"; ~hareholder who is the victim of a
"de-ta.~to merger" to which he objects.
In Fa~ris v. Glen' Alden Corporation, 393
Pa. 42~, 143 A.2d 25, the Supreme Court of
"1', '
Pennu'lvania extended the -right theretofo~e ,~iven to shareholders dissenting from
a metg~r to the shareholders of a corporation th'lt had agreed to acquite all of the
", I
assets ;of another corporation in exchange
for siock. The court noted that while
shareholders were not entitled under the
Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law to
that this company was privately held for
the benefit of the, Ahmanson family.
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If, after trial of the cause, plaintiff has
established f~cts in conformity with the allegations of the complaint and stipulation,
then upon tender of her Association stock
to defendants she will be entitled to receive
at her election either the appraised value of
Appraisal rights protect the dissenting
her shares on the date of the exchange,
minority shareholder against being forced
May 14, 1959, with interest at 7 percent a
to either remain an investor in an enteryear from the date of this action or a sum
prise fundamentally different than that in
equivalent to the fair market value of a "de_
which he invested or sacrifice his investrived block" of United Financial stock
ment by sale of his share~ at less than a
on the date of this action with interest
fair value. (O'Neal and Derwin, Exthereon from t11at date.,.and the sum of
pulsion or Oppression of Business Asso. $927.50 (the return of capital paid to the
ciates (1961), supra, 62.) Plaintiff here
original United Financial shareholders)
was entitled to no less. But she was enwith interest thereon from the date United
titled to more. In the circumstances of this
Financial first . made such payments to its
case she should have heen accorded the
original shareholders, for each share tensame opportunity to exchange her Assodered. The appraised or fair market value
ciation stock for that of United Financial
shall be reduced, however, by the amount
accorded the majority.
by which dividends paid on Association
Although a controlling shareholder who
shares during the period from May 14,
sells or exchanges his shares is not under
1959 to the present exceeds the dividends
an obligation to obtain for the minority the
paid on a corresponding block of United
consideration that he receives in all cases,
Financial shares during the same period.
when he does sell or exchange his shares
V
the transaction is subject to close s·crutiny.
The
Cartwright
Act
When the majority receives a premium
over market value for its shares, the con[8] Plaintiff contends that the stipusideration for which that premium is paid lated facts and the allegations of the comwill be examined. If it reflects payment plaint also state a cause of action for refor that which is properly a corporate asset straint of trade in violation of the Cartall shareholders may demand to share pro- wright Act. (Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 16720portionately. (Perlman v. Feldmann, su- 16758.) That Act makes unlawful any
pra, 219 F.2d 173.) Here the exchange was "t";st" (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16726), dean integral part of a scheme that the de- fined as 'a "combination of capital, skill or
fendants could reasonably foresee would acts by two or more persons for [inter alia]
have as an incidental effect the destruction the following purposes: (a) To create or
of the potential public market for Associa- carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
tion stock. The remaining stockholders * * * (c) To prevent competition in
would thus be deprived of the opportunity * * * purchase of * * * any comto realize a profit from those intangible modity." (BllS. & Prof.Code, § 16720.) Decharacteristics that attach to publicly mar- fendants do not contend that shares of stock
keted stock and enhance its value above are not a commodity within the contemplabook value. Receipt of an appraised value . tion of the Legislature when it adopted the
reflecting book value and earnings alone Cartwright Act. We assume arguendo that
could not compensate the ~inority share- the Cartwright Act applies to transactions
holders for the loss of this potential. Since in corporate shares.
the damage is real, although the amount is
Plaintiff has alleged that "the Delaware
speculative, equity demands that the minorExchange comprised an agreement to comity stockholders be placed in a position at bine and a combination of the participants'
least as favorable as that the majority cre- capital and interest in Association guaranated for themselves.
tee stock which prevented and precluded

dissent if the corporation acquired the as·
sets of another corporation without more,
where the transaction had the effect of a
merger the shareholders should have been
given the rights of dissent and appraisal.
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free and unrestricted competition among
themselves in the purchase of a com~
modity, ,to wit: ASSOCIATION guarantee stock." (Complaint, par. IIr.) Read
in conjunction 'with the further allegation
that defendants comprised 95 percent of the
market for guarantee stock' the complaint
thus alleges ill substance that the effect of
the defendants' action was to prevent competition in the only -existing market for
Association stock. The complaint does not
allege, however, that thi,s was a purpose
of the defendants' actions or that defendpurants agreed among themselves 'not
chase further shares of Association stock
from the minority stockholders. Even accorded the liberal <:onstruction of pleadings required by section 452 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the .allegations ,of the' complaint when read in their entirety fail to
supply the necessary element of purpose,
A cause of action for restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act or common law
principles must allege both·3 purpose to
restrain trade and injury, to the business of
the ,plaintiff traceable to actions in furtherance of that purpose. (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 16756; Speegle v. Board of Fire
Underwriters, 29 Cal2d 34, 41, 172 P.2d
867; Willis .v. Santa .Ana .etc. Hospital
Assn., 58 Ca1.2d 806, 808, 8\0, 26 Cal.Rptr.
640, 376 P.2d 568.)

'to

lack of factual allegations of specific conduct directed toward, furtherance of a COIIspiracy to eliminate or reduce competition '
in the trading of Association stock renders
the complaint insufficient (Chicago Title
Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp.,
69 Ca1.2d 305, 327, 70 Cal.Rptr. 849, 444
P.2d 481.)

VI
. Defendants' Appeal
[9] Defendants appeal from the judgment uonly with respect'to the overruling
," by the court of the * * * specifications
, of" th~ demurrer based on lach,es, uncer""
tainty in designation of the identity and
number of persons constituting the class
plaintiff purports to represent, and failure
to separately state multiple causes of action. An order' overruling a demurrer is
not appealable. (Code Civ.Proc. § 904.1
[formerly § %3]. See 3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure, Appeal, §, 19(a).) Although the'
judgment· from which defendants appeal
recites the order overruling the demurrer, the order remains interlocutory and
nonappealable.
Inasmuch as the questions may arise
again on appeal from the final judgment,
·however, we de~m it appropriate to comment on defendants' contentions.

Although ,it may be siufficie~t in some
Laches
instances to allege solely. the effect of such
combination from which a purpose to elim[10] The exchange of Association stock
for United Financial stock by defendants
inate competition ~ay be inferred, when. as
here, the defendant is alleged to have be- occurred on May 14, 1959. The first pubcome 'the sole' market for ~hares of stock . lie offering of United Financial stock and
of a single. closely held corporation and ~' sale, of the debentures followed on or
purpose unrelated to elimination or' reduc:" abol~t June 10, .1960. United Financial's
tion of competition - affirmatively appears offe'r ,to the minority stockholders to puron the face of the complaint no 'such infer- chase ,their ~tock was made in September
196Q. The application for a permit to ex-'
ence will be drawn. Failure of the plaintiff to allege either an agreement -among change United Financial shares for! Asthe defendants not to purchase shares 'of soci~tion stock held by the minority stockAssociation stock for their own accounts holders was filed ,on August 21, 1961 and
or that this was a purPose of the transfer the hearings thereon were held on Sepof their shares to United Financial rel1- tember 29 and October 11, 1961. United
ders the complaint insufficient insofar Financial's request that the application be
as it purports to state a cause of action withdrawn followed. The plaintiff comfor relief under the Cartwright Act The menced this action on January 30, 1962.
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The delay in initiating this action was
not so long as to be unreasonable and to
constitute laches as a matter of law. It
is well established that mere lapse of time
without showing of prejudice to the defendant does not constitute laches. (Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal.2d 864, 904, 69
Cal.Rptr. 612, 442 P.2d 692; Beverage v.
Canton Placer Mining Co., 43 Cal.2d 769,
777, 278 P.2d 694; Magoire v. Hibernia
Say. & Loan Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719, 746, 146
P.2d 673, lSI A.L.R. 1062; McGibbon v.
Schmidt, 172 Cal. 70, 74, ISS P. 460.)
Since prejudice to the defendants does not
appear from the complaint and stipulated
facts, the order of the trial court overruling the demurrer on that ground was
proper.

The Class Represented by Plaintiff
[11] Defendants complain that plaintiff's definition of the class she purports
-to represent as "all of that portion of the
other minority stockholders who are similarly situated who wish to rely thereon and
who agree to compensate Plainti f£ and
her attorneys for reasonable attorneys' fees
in an amount to be determined by the
Court after trial" is "too i11-defined and
ephemeral in make-up" to constitute a class
for the purpose of a class action. They
base this contention on the holding of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Giordano v. Radio Corporation of America, 183 F.2d 558, 560561, that a class composed of persons who
"are in agreement with the plaintiff" -cannot constitute a class for this purpose.
Defendants' reliance on that case is misplaced. Plaintiff here desigoates the class
as the minority stockholders of the Association. Those similarily situated are easily
identified as all of those persons who continued to hold Association stock subsequent to the defendants' exchange of shares
for United Financial shares. There is no
s1!-ggestion that the class is limited to persons who agree with the plaintiff. The
further identification of the class as those

persons who agree to share in plaintiff's
litigation expense does no more than state
the applicable rule with regard to equitable
apportionment of the litigation expenses incurred by a plaintiff who successfully
prosecutes an action on behalf of a class.
(Spragoe v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S.
161, 166, S9 S.C!. 777, 83L.Ed. 1184;
Estate of Reade, 31 Cal.2d 669, 672, 191 P.
2d 745; Farmers etc. Nat. Bank of Los
Angeles v. Peterson,S Cal.2d 601, 607, 55
P.2d 867.)
The rule of this jurisdiction with respect
to class actions is found in section 382 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part: "* * * when
the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons. or when the
parties are numerous. and it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court,
one or more may sue or defend for the
benefit of all." We have held that the two
requisites of a class action under this
section are an "ascertainable class * * *
and * * * a well defined community of
interest in the questions of law and fact
involved affecting the parties to be represented." (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.
2d 695, 704, 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d
732, 739.) It is apparent that the requisite
community of interest exists among the
minority shareholders of the Association
and that the class is readily ascertainable.
The demurrer was properly overruled.
Our holding that plaintiff's complaint
fails to state a canse of action for restraint
of trade disposes of defendants' further
contention that the complaint fails to separately state multiple causes of action.
The judgment appealed from by plainti ff is reversed. The trial court is directed
to overrule the demurrer in conformity
with this opinion. Defendants' appeal is
dismissed.
PETERS, TOBRINER, BURKE, and
SULLIVAN, JJ., and COUGHLIN, J. pro
tem.,* concur.

* Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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McCOMB, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. I would affirm the judgment
in favor of defendants for the reasons
expressed by Mr. Justice Shinn and Mr.
Justice Moss in the opinions prepared by
thelll for the Court of Appeal in Jones v.
H. F. Ahmanson & Company (Cal.App.)
76 Cal.Rptr. 293.
Rehearing denied;
senting.

McCOMB, J., dis-

COUGHLIN, J., sitting pro tem: in place
of. MOSK, J., who deemed himself disqualified.
w

o : m lUMBER SYSUM
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81 Cal.Rptr. 609
In ro Darryl Thoma. KEMP

on Habeas Corpus.
Cr. 13136.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Nov. 14, 1969.

Petitioner sought writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court, Peters, J., held
that where at least 10 of 12 jurors were
excluded without determination that they
would automatically vote against imposition of capital punishment without regard
to any evidence' developed at trial, judg-

ment imposing death penalty had to be reversed.

Judgment imposing death penalty vacated, and case remanded for new penalty
trial; balance of judgment affirmed.
McComb, ]., dissented.
I. Abatement a.d Revival ¢=>8(2)

Fact that accused was ordered by superior court produced for purpose of sanity hearing and that sanity prOceeding was
still pending would not preclude Supreme
Court fropt determining validity ,of accused's conviction on petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
West's Ann.Pen.Code,
§ 3701.
2. Crlml.allaw ¢=>1166V,(6)

Where at least 10 of 12 jurors were
excluded without determination that they
460 P.2d-31

would automatically vote against imposi-,
tion of capital punishment without regard
to any. evidence developed at trial, judgment imposing death penalty had to be reversed.
3. Crlml.al law _94

Where prosecution's expert witness, a
psychiatrist, testified that accused was fully conscious when he committed crimes of
murder, rape and kidnapping and had no
brain injury -and had ability to premeditate,
and deliberate and where crimes concerned
rape and murder of nurse in her apartment,
rape of woman to whom accused had offered ride home and kidnapping and rape
of woman who was driving through park
and where psychiatrist testified that accused's motive was sexual gratification,
jury could properly find that accused was
capable of specific intent required for the
crimes.
4. Homicide ¢=>347

Court would not exercise its power to
reduce conviction from first-degree to
second-degree murder for accused, who
raped and -murdered nurse in her apartment West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1181, subd.

6.

Marshall, Busby & Clark and Dwain
Clark, Los Angeles,- for petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., John T.
Murphy and Horace Wheatley, Deputy
Attys. Gen., for respondent.
PETERS, Justice.
Darryl Thomas Kemp, under sentence of
death for murder, petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus. The writ must be granted
as to the penalty under the rules announced in'Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968),391 U.
S. 510, 88 S.C!. 1770,20 L.Ed.2d 776, but denied insofar as the petition seeks to attack
the judgment of guilt.
[1] Petitioner was convicted after a
jury trial of one count of murder of the
first degree, two counts of rape, and one
count of kidnapping. He was found by the
jury to have been sane at the time of the

